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For social scientists - and not only economists1 - the privatization pro­
grammes of Western Europe provide a particularly rich field of investigation, 
in order to assess the political, electoral, social, and even cultural impact of a 
major public policy2. Privatization has raised profound philosophical and 
moral questions about property rights, about the concept of the state, about the 
relationship between market, state and society, and about the nature of public 
goods. And these questions have come to haunt the courts and public policy 
makers. For specialists of public policy, privatization has also furnished mate­
rial to explore the validity of rational choice theories, theories of regulation, 
interest group theories, new institutionalism as well as the arguments relating 
to policy networks and policy communities3.
The privatization programmes also enable us to illustrate some of the key 
features of public policy, and it is this aspect of the programmes which forms 
the basis of this article. Its particular focus is the policy paradox, and its major 
argument is that privatization has often been presented as a panacea, but it has 
given rise to several paradoxes which suggest that it may be as problematic as 
nationalisation for public decision makers. Some of the paradoxes are rooted 
in the peculiar characteristics of specific privatization programmes, and some 
may be only temporary. Others, however, may prove to be inherent in the 
process itself, and may be a source of permanent difficulty for governments.
* This paper is scheduled to appear in Italian in Stato e Mercalo
1 The best single work, though now somewhat dated, on the economics of privatization is 
John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press, 1988.
2 See particularly John Ernst, Whose Utility? The Social Impact o f Public Utility Privatiza­
tion and Regulation in Britain, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1994; and Peter 
Saunders and Colin Harris, Privatization and Popular Capitalism, Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 1994.
3 See, for example, Ellen M. Pint, ‘Nationalization and Privatization: A Rational Choice Per­
spective on Efficiency’, Journal o f Public Policy, 10, 3, pp. 267-298; Jeffrey R. Henig, 
Chris Hammett and Harvey Feigenbaum, ‘The Politics of Privatization: A Comparative 
Perspective’, Governance, 1, October 1988, pp. 442-468; Jeremy Moon, J.J. Richardson 
and Paul Smart, ‘The Privatization of British Telecom: A Case Study of the Extended Pro­
cess of Legislation’, European Journal o f Political Research, Vol. 14 (3), 1986, pp. 339- 
358; Joel Wolfe, ‘Reorganising Interest Representation: A Political Analysis of Privatiza­
tion’ , in Richard E. Foglesong and Joel D. Wolfe, The Politics o f Economic Adjustment, 
New York, Greenwood, 1989, pp. 3-24; Abigail Melville, ‘Power, Strategy and Games: 





























































































The article is divided into three main parts: a brief summary of the pro­
grammes; an equally brief section on the main public policy concepts high­
lighted by those privatization programmes; a final section on the policy para­
doxes and a tentative explanation of their emergence.
I. The Privatization Programmes4
Privatization is a world-wide phenomenon which has spread from 
Pinochet’s Chile to communist China. Figures on the scale of privatization 
vary enormously. According to one set of figures privatization in 1992 took 
place in over fifty countries raising $69 billion, bringing the world total from 
1985 to early 1993 to $328 billion (Economist, 21 August 1993; Expansion, 7- 
20 October 1993). According to another source, the world volume of new 
privatization issues in 1993 totalled £24.3 billion, and between £33 billion and 
£40 billion were due to pour onto the stock exchanges in 1994 (Euromoney, 5 
June 1994). Even with the slow down caused by the depressed state of the 
financial markets European privatization, issues were expected to raise some
4 The literature on privatization is vast. See, particularly, Raymond Vernon (ed.). The 
Promise o f Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy, New York, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1988; David Clutterbuck (ed.), Going Private: Privatizations Around the World, 
London, Mercury Books, 1991; Ezra E. Suleiman and John Waterbury (eds.), The Politi­
cal Economy o f Public Sector Reform and Privatization, Boulder, Col., Westview Press, 
1990; Dennis Swann, The Retreat o f the State: Deregulation and Privatization in the UK 
and US, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1988; E.S. Savas, Privatizing the 
Public Sector: How to Shrink Government, Chatham, N.J., Chatham House, 1982; 
William T. Gormley (ed.). Privatization and its Alternatives, Madison, University of Wis­
consin Press, 1991; W.P. Glade (ed.). State Shrinking: A Comparative Enquiry into Pri­
vatization, Austin, Texas, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1986; D.J. Gayle and J.N. 
Goodrich (eds.), Privatization and Deregulation in Global Perspective, London, Pinter 
Publishers, 1990; P.W. Macavey etal. Privatization and State-Owned Enterprises, Lon­
don, KJuwer Academic Publications, 1989; Steve H. Hanke (ed.), Prospects for Privatiza­
tion, New York, Academy of Political Science, 1987; Elizabeth E. Bailey and Janet R. 
Pack (eds.). The Political Economy o f Privatization and Deregulation, Aldershot, Elgar, 
1995; Thomas Clarke and Christos Pitelis (eds.), The Political Economy o f Privatization, 
London, Routledge, 1993; Peter M. Jackson and Catherine M. Price (eds.), Privatization 
and Regulation: A Review o f the Issues, London, Longman, 1994; Fernando Targetti, 
Privatization in Europe: West and East Experiences, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1992; John 
Donahue, The Privatization Debate, New York, Basic Books, 1989; P. MacAvoy, W. 
Stanbury, G. Yarrow and R. Zeckhauser (eds.). Privatization and State-Owned Enter­
prises, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989; J.J. Richardson (ed.). Privatization 
and Deregulation in Canada and Britain, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1990; Roman Fryaman 
and Andrej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? 





























































































$40 billion in 1995. Problems of calculating the extent of the privatization 
programmes lie in the fact that industrial privatization takes many forms - 
from sales of subsidiaries and minority stakes to sales of majority stakes and 
even total privatization - and employs many methods, including stock market 
flotation, off-market sales to other firms, and management buy-outs.
Western Europe has not been spared the ‘privatization craze’5: between 
1994 and 1999 privatization in Western Europe is expected to raise between 
$80 billion and $150 billion, according to the source used (Econom ist, 21 
August 1993).
The timing, pace, extent and nature of the privatization programmes vary 
enormously from country to country - and this is scarcely surprising because 
the size, structure and nature of the public sectors to be privatized differ con­
siderably, because the pressures to privatize vary in time and in intensity, and 
because the will and capacity to privatize reveal significant differences. Some 
of these factors will be touched upon in this article. The most timid privatizers 
to date have been Sweden and Greece where electoral defeats of the Right re­
sulted in the abandonment of ambitious programmes: the Swedish $10 billion 
programme embraced steel, ore-mining, electric power and the powerful 
multi-product holding company Procordia. However, in both countries, some 
privatization was implemented (19 percent of Procordia was sold in 1987, and 
the Greek government returned to the private sector a number of recently 
acquired firms), and more moderate programmes are likely to resume (the 
new PASOK government in Greece is trying - though not very successfully - 
to sell 25 per cent of its public sector telecommunications monopoly6).
Middle-range privatizers include Belgium (which has sold a number of 
small firms and partially privatized several major companies, including RTM, 
the shipping company, Distrigaz, the gas utility, and Sabena, the national flag 
carrier), the Netherlands (which has only a small public industrial sector but 
which it is progressively, if partially, privatizing - hence the part sales of 
DSM, the chemical giant, KLM, the state airline, and Koninklijke PTT Neder­
land, the post and telephone monopoly), and Spain (which has seen the disposal 
of more than twenty firms belonging to Patrimonio and INI, the two major 
state industrial holdings, as well as the sale of shares, worth $8 billion between
5 Vincent Wright (ed.), Privatization in Western Europe: Pressures, Problems and Para­
doxes, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994. This contains articles on the major privatization 
programmes and a short bibliographical guide for each country.





























































































1986 and 1994, in Repsol, the oil company, Argentaria, the financial group, 
Telefonica and Endesa, the electricity utility). Italy also belongs to the ranks of 
middle-range privatizers, having, for most of the 1980s, been a distinctly 
timid one: since only thirty smaller companies were sold to the private sector. 
The real change came with the Amato and Ciampi governments, starting in 
1990 with measures which set out the procedures to enable state-controlled and 
mutually-owned savings banks to transform themselves into joint stock com­
panies, and which allowed state-owned banks to float up to 49 per cent of their 
equity on the stock market. The state holding companies IRI, ENEL, INA and 
ENA were converted into joint stock companies, with the Treasury as sole 
shareholder. The companies designated for privatization - whole or partial - 
include several banks and insurance companies, Agip (oil and gas exploration), 
Nuovo Pignone (turbines and engineering), SNAM (gas pipelines), and Stet 
(telecommunications). The Amato and Ciampi programmes involved the sale 
of $10 billion - massively ambitious in a country such as Italy, with its 
ephemeral governments, multiple political obstacles, weak financial markets 
and lack of investment culture. Yet, inspite of widespread scepticism, several 
political battles and the fall of both governments, the programme has proved 
relatively successful. The first big flotation was the oversubscribed public 
offer for 67 per cent of Credito Italiano in December 1993: it raised 1,900 
billion lire. This was followed by the sale of 33 per cent of Istituto Mobiliare 
Italiano in January 1994 for 2,400 billion lire, of 54 per cent of Banca Com- 
merciale Italiana in February 1994 for 2,800 billion lire, and 47 per cent of 
INA, the insurance group, in June 1994 for 4,500 billion lire. There were also 
a number of important trade sales (ENI, for example, sold about 60 firms 
between 1992 and 1994 and IRI disposed of the last parts of its once mighty 
steel sector in spring 1995). Future privatization candidates include ENEL, 
Stet, ENI, the last fragments of SME, Agip, and SNAM. Significantly, by the 
end of 1994, the committee of the Senate agreed on the framework for the 
independent regulation of public utilities. It seems clear that, whatever the 
political difficulties, the budgetary needs of the state and the capital 
requirements of the enterprises will ensure that Italy will remain, however 
fitfully, a privatizer7.
The radical privatizers in Western Europe are Germany, Portugal, France, 
and, of course, the United Kingdom. The Kohl government, after a long phase 
of indifference and scepticism, came to dispose of the central state’s sharehold­
ing in Veba (energy), Volkswagen, Vega (metals and chemicals) and Salzgitter





























































































(steel and engineering), and the public stake in Lufthansa, the national airline 
was reduced from 51 to 36 per cent in 1994, and is scheduled to disappear en­
tirely. More importantly, it has now overcome all the obstacles, constitutional 
and political, which prevented the privatization of Deutsche Telekom. The 
privatization of the German telecommunications giant will represent one of the 
biggest financial operations in post-war Europe and is scheduled to take place 
in at least two stages. Germany’s claim to be a radical privatizer rests also on 
its plans to privatize part of the postal services and sell part of the railways to 
the Lander, and on its rapid disposal by early 1995 of all but 1,392 of the 
13,200 public firms acquired in East Germany at the time of unification8.
The centre right government of Cavaco Silva, in power for over ten years 
in Portugal, was an enthusiastic and radical privatizer from the outset. The 
1986 privatization programme lists 60 major directly state-owned companies 
and 450 indirectly owned to be transferred to the private sector. However, 
much of the public sector was protected by the Constitution which had been 
drawn up in the early revolutionary days of democratic transition and which 
declared that nationalisation represented an ‘irreversible victory of the work­
ing class’. It took several years of patient negotiations with the socialist oppo­
sition to pass the necessary constitutional amendments. The effective 
implementation process began in 1989 with the sale of 49 per cent of Banco 
Totta e Acores, the country’s biggest bank. After some difficulties (for exam­
ple, the failure in 1993, through lack of buyers to sell a bank, a cement pro­
ducer and a steel company), the programme was accelerated in 1993 and 1994 
when stakes in telecommunications, the important cement industry, banking, 
insurance, and the gas and electricity utilities were sold. In 1994, the govern­
ment raised over Esc. 200 billion ($1.1 billion), and by early summer 1995 
plans for the privatization of Portugal Telecom, of the state-owned water 
industry and of part of Portucel (a paper pulp and packaging group which 
alone accounts for 2 per cent of the country’s exports) were well advanced.
The privatization of subsidiaries of public-sector groups has been a constant 
feature of French state-managers’ strategies. It took place during the Giscard 
d’Estaing presidency of 1974 to 1981 and under the socialist governments of 
the Mitterrand presidency of 1981 to 1986. These socialist governments also 
devised a variety of means to introduce private capital into public enterprises. 
However, it was not until the right-wing election victory and the appointment 
of the Chirac government in 1986 that radical privatization was pursued. The
8 On the role of the Treuhand, the body charged with privatizing these firms, see the special 




























































































Chirac programme envisaged the total privatization of 65 major companies 
which involved, with subsidiaries, a total of 1,454 firms and 755,000 employ­
ees. By the time it was brought to a halt, as a result of the stock market crash 
of October 1987, eleven flotations had taken place, including those of eight 
major groups (Saint Gobain, Paribas, CGE, Crédit Commercial de France, 
Havas, Société Générale, Suez and TF1, the television channel). There were 
also three off-market sales. The programme represented a third of that ini­
tially planned, raised FF 85 billion and increased the number of shareholders 
from 1.2 million to 7 million. Radical privatization was brought to an official 
halt with the re-election of Mitterrand in May 1988 and the election victory of 
the socialists in the following month. Partial privatization, however, contin­
ued, with the sale of subsidiaries, the sale of FF 8 billion worth of minority 
stakes in major state groups, and the recapitalising of public firms with private 
capital. Joint ventures and capital swaps were also encouraged between 
national public enterprises and foreign private groups (BNP with Dresdner 
Bank, Bull with NEC and IBM, Renault with Volvo). The Balladur govern­
ment, appointed in the wake of the Right’s election victory of 1993, extended 
and radicalized the Chirac government’s programme of 1986. The $50 billion 
programme included not only those twelve groups which had not been priva­
tized in 1986, but also nine new enterprises, including Air France, the national 
airline, Aerospatiale, the defence contractor, Renault, the car manufacturer 
which had been nationalised by the de Gaulle government at the time of the 
Liberation, SEITA, the state tobacco monopoly, and Usinor-Sacilor, the steel 
group9.
Several major problems faced the Balladur government: the financial state 
of many of the privatisables; political and worker opposition to restructuring 
and privatization (the cases, notably, of Renault and of Air France); the 
depressed state of the Bourse and of the financial markets in general. How­
ever, several major flotations took place: Banque Nationale de Paris, Rhône- 
Poulenc, Union des Assurances de Paris, followed in February 1994 by the 
sale of 37 per cent of Elf-Aquitaine which raised nearly FF 35 billion bought 
by over three million shareholders, in the country’s biggest ever privatization 
issue. This was quickly succeeded, in May 1994, by the FF 20 billion sale of 
50 per cent of Union des Assurances de Paris, the country’s biggest insurance
9 On privatization in France see Michel Dumpty, Les Privatisations en France, Paris, Docu­
mentation Française, 1988; Abdelilah Hamdouch, V Etat d ’influence: Nationalisations et 
Privatisations en France, Paris, Presses du CNRS, 1989; Edouard Balladur, Je crois en 
l ’homme plus qu’en l ’Etat, Paris, Flammarion, 1987; Edouard Comtreau (ed.). Privatisa­
tions: l ’art et la manière, Paris, L’Harmothen, 1986; Mairi Maclean, ‘Privatization in 
France 1993-94: New Departures, or a case of plus ça change’. West European Politics, 




























































































group. By spring 1995, an important tranche of Renault (worth $2,048 mil­
lion) and the whole of the SEITA (worth $700 million), the tobacco 
monopoly, had also left the public sector. In all, the Balladur government had 
raised FF 94.4 billion, inspite of all the problems. The election of Chirac to 
the Presidency and his appointment of Juppé to the Premiership appeared to 
give added impetus to the privatization drive. Within two weeks of his 
appointment Juppé announced the early privatization of Usinor-Sacilor, and 
declared his hope of raising FF 50 billion in total privatization receipts to help 
reduce the budget deficit and finance job creation schemes.
By far the most extensive privatization programme has been that of the 
United Kingdom10. By the time of the 1993 election the Conservative gov­
ernment proudly boasted that it had transferred 46 major companies and over 
900,000 employees to the private sector, raising £55 billion and creating 
eleven million new shareholders. The programme embraced not only firms in 
the international competitive environment such as Jaguar and Rover, the car 
manufacturers, but also defence related industries (British Aerospace and 
Royal Ordnance), ‘strategic’ industries such as BP and Britoil, the national flag 
carrier (British Airways), the steel giant British Steel, the national airports, 
and the public utilities of gas (British Gas which was sold as a monopoly), 
water (split into ten regional monopolies), electricity (sold as twelve regional 
monopolies) and telecommunications (British Telecom which was sold with its 
dominant market position intact). In 1979, nationalised industries accounted 
for 9 per cent of the country’s GSP - a figure which had shrunk to 3 per cent 
by early 1994 when only a minority stake in the electricity generating indus­
try, the Post Office, British Rail, the nuclear energy sector and a few mines 
belonging to British Coal remained in the public sector. The remaining 40 
percent stake in National Power and Power Gen was disposed of in March 
1995, British Coal was privatized, in controversial circumstances, at the end of 
1994, and most of the nuclear energy industry was prepared for privatization 
for late 1995. However, the partial privatization of the Post Office was thrown 
out by the House of Commons in 1994 after a revolt of a group of Conserva­
10 On the UK experience see J. Kay, C. Mayer and D. Thompson (eds.). Privatization and 
Regulation: the UK Experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986; Cosmo Graham and 
Tony Prosser, Privatizing Public Enterprises, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990; R. Fraser 
and M. Wilson. Privatization: the UK Experience and International Trends, Harlow, 
Longman, 1988; V. Ramanadham (ed.), Privatization in the United Kingdom, London, 
Routledge, 1988; D. Steel and D. Heald. Privatizing Public Enterprises: Options and 
Dilemmas, London, RIPA, 1984; K. Wiltshire (ed.), Privatization: the British Experience, 
London, Longman, 1987; C. Veljanowski, Selling the State, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987; Mathew Bishop, John Kay and Colin Mayer, Privatization tnd Economic 




























































































tive members, and the privatization of British Rail is a technical nightmare and 
is behind schedule. Nevertheless, inspite of these recent problems, the British 
privatization remains awesome in its dimensions, since it has involved the 
biggest transfer of property in the country since the dissolution of the monas­
teries by Henry VIII, a major reshaping of state-industry relations, and the 
rise of new modes of economic regulation (see below).
The trend in Western Europe is clear: everywhere the pace and extent of 
privatization is accelerating, and its nature is becoming more radical. Yet, the 
picture remains a varied one, both in the extent and nature of the programmes, 
and this variety, together with the reasons for the variety, helps to explain 
some of the paradoxes of privatization described later in this article.
II. The Major Policy Features of Privatization
The various privatization programmes have admirably illustrated several 
important interconnected features of public policy making. They are worth 
very briefly outlining, because they, together with the differing character of 
privatization programmes across Western Europe, help to explain the policy 
paradoxes which are the principal focus of this article.
- policy panacea: for its apologists, privatization is a means of shifting the 
boundary between public and private in favour of the latter, of combating the 
semi-collectivist consensus of the post-war years, of tapping individual and 
corporate enterprise and initiative, of increasing consumer choice, of constructing 
a property-owning democracy, of facilitating rationalisation, liberalisation and 
globalisation, of improving efficiency by enhancing competition, of strengthening 
national industry, of sensitising the mass of new shareholders to the exigencies of 
the market place, of solving the vexed relationship between the state and its 
public-sector managers, of weakening the trades unions (traditionally powerful in 
the public sector), of enabling enterprises more easily to raise capital on the 
international capital markets, of expanding domestic stock exchanges, and, of 
course, of raising revenues for hard-pressed governments. Thus, ideological, 
economic, managerial, political and financial reasons are forwarded by advocates 
of privatization - although the mix and intensity of conviction differs from country 
to country.
- policy convergence: a tendency for industrialised states to develop similarities in 
structures, policies, processes and performance11. Driven by convergent pressures
11 Clark Kerr, The Future o f Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity?, 




























































































- liberalisation, internationalisation, Communitarianisation (the impact of the Euro­
pean Union), technological change and the budgetary needs of governments and 
firms - we are beginning to see somewhat convergent policy responses: all West­
ern European governments have privatization programmes or ambitions. The pro­
cess of convergence is taking place through elite networking (the impact of 
transnational ‘knowledge based’ or ‘epistemic communities’), through harmo­
nization (the influence of international or intergovernmental regimes such as the 
European Union), through emulation (the influence of the British model), and 
through penetration (pressure by external actors or interests such as the interna­
tional banking community)12. However, convergence around the policy of priva­
tization should not disguise the very wide differences which remain across West­
ern Europe on the motives, extent, nature, methods and impact of the various pri­
vatization programmes (see above).
- policy fashion: the establishment of a new axiom - in this case, the inevitability 
and desirability of privatization which is now on the policy agenda of every West 
European government. The emergence of a policy fashion raises some interesting 
public policy questions: why was territorial centralisation the policy fashion of the 
1950s but decentralisation that of the 1970s and 1980s? Why does neo-Keyne- 
sianism give way to neo-liberalism as the policy fashion? How did the idea of ‘big 
is beautiful’ come to be so powerful? And how to explain its replacement by the 
‘small is beautiful’ fashion? Why has an increased sensitivity to certain aspects of 
supply-side economics (education and training) become a policy fashion in the 
1990s? It would be highly instructive to explore the process by which the fashion 
of nationalisation of the 1940s and 1950s was superseded by that of indicative 
planning in the 1960s, only to be replaced by that of privatization and regulation 
in the 1980s and 1990s13. Part of the answer may lie in Hirschman’s observation 
that any policy extensively pursued automatically sets up reactions which lead to 
its dism antlement14. Another part of the explanation for policy diffusion lies in 
the role of international organisations as well as transnational groups of economic 
advisors, administrative officials, academics, directly affected actors, and ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’15.
- policy reversal:16 significant change in existing policies. Traditional models of 
public policy making are profoundly conservative, since they emphasise incremen­
talism as the dominant mode of policy making and underline the tendency towards 
policy inertia as well as the difficulties of policy termination. Policy is presented
12 I have borrowed the categories of Colin J. Bennet, ‘What is Policy Convergence and What 
Causes It?’, British Journal o f Political Science, 21, April 1991, pp. 215-233.
13 For some interesting insights, see Peter Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: 
Keynesianism across Countries, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990.
14 Albert Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 170-171.
15 See Nancy C. Roberts, ‘Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation’, Policy Studies Review, 
Spring 1992, Vol. 11(1), pp. 55-74.




























































































as balkanised and sectoralised and processed through policy networks of small 
groups of powerful actors, who are often highly institutionalised, and are bound 
together by self-interest and by a high degree of consensus upon major objectives. 
These actors enjoy largely symmetrical resources and engage in constant and bar­
gained processes of adjustment in a non zero sum game. Major policy changes are 
excluded because they suggest lack of consensus or they may lead to upset in the 
policy network. Another school of public policy, greatly influenced by public 
choice, stresses the role of powerful interdependent interest groups, in collusion 
with budget-expanding bureaucrats, in defending and extending the public 
sector. The extension and radicalisation of the various privatization programmes 
point to the limitations of these two traditional approaches, and suggest that 
public policy specialists should pay more attention to the processes of change 
provoked by exogenous shocks, new ideas, new coalitions, technology, and even 
the exercise of political power (as in France and the United Kingdom).
- policy linkage and policy spillover, the linkage of a policy - deliberately or inad­
vertently - with other policies. Privatization has come to be linked with liberalisa­
tion, administrative deregulation, marketisation (the introduction of competitive 
markets within the public sector), customerisation (increasing the power of con­
sumers in the production of public goods), public-sector reform, revenue raising. It 
has its own dynamic which creates new interests, strengthens some existing ones 
whilst weakening or marginalising others. This reconfiguration of interests, as the 
result of privatization, encourages or facilitates the pursuit of other linked policies: 
hence, spillover. There is now a powerful pro-privatization lobby in most West 
European countries comprising financial interests, public sector bosses anxious for 
autonomy, right-wing ideologues and politicians, and revenue-hungry govern­
ments. Spillover can be seen in another way: once one major West European 
country has implemented a radical programme of privatization, it will automatically 
press for similar programmes elsewhere - in the name of reciprocity. Why, for 
example, in an open European market should French and German investors be 
allowed to buy shares in British Telecom, but British investors are prevented from 
buying stakes in Deutsche Telekom or France Télécom? Functional spillover, but 
not in the sense understood in the neo-functionalist literature on the European 
Union, - however slow, sporadic or hesitant - appears to be an ineluctable part of 
European market integration.
- policy slippage: the gap between, on the one hand, overall ambitions and pro­
grammes, and, on the other, the programmes and practical outcomes. The various 
privatization programmes perfectly illustrate the phenomenon. In most countries - 
even the United Kingdom and France - slippage occurs between ambitions and 
programmes: constitutional, juridical, institutional, financial market, and political 
constraints have affected not only the timing and pace but also the extent and 
nature of the programmes adopted (see below). The failure to privatize 51 per cent 
of the Post Office in the United Kingdom and the slowing down of several major 
privatizations in France are reminders that even resolute governments with power­




























































































outcomes may also best be seen in Britain and France - the two most radical priva­
tiz es . Thus, one of the declared ambitions of the Thatcher and Chirac govern­
ments was to use privatization as a means of creating ‘a property-owning democ­
racy’ imbued with ‘an enterprise culture’. And, indeed, by the sale of shares at 
below market value and a series of attractively priced bonuses, a mass sharehold­
ing has been created in both countries. However, the impact of this mass share­
holding has been very limited. Many new shareholders sold their shares immedi­
ately or within a year of purchase, and most have shares in only one privatized 
industry. In other words, privatization has widened but not deepened ownership. 
In both countries, no attempt has been made to confer any corporate power on the 
dispersed mass of small shareowners. And in both countries, inspite of the increase 
in the number of shareholders, the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors (often foreign) continues to increase: wider shareholding masks, there­
fore, its increasing concentration. Finally, the cultural impact of privatization seems 
to have been negligible17.
- policy fiasco', the pursuit of a policy which ends in ignominious consequences18. 
Recent literature on this phenomenon tends to analyse fiascoes in terms of policy 
outcomes. But the privatization programmes suggest that the fiasco may take 
place during the policy process. Thus, in October 1987, as the result of the world­
wide stock exchange crash, the Chirac government had to abandon its privatiza­
tion programme, and the British government had to buy back the shares of British 
Petroleum which it was selling at the time. The other big buyer of BP shares at the 
time was the Kuwait Investment Office - a financial body owned by the Kuwaiti 
government - the owner of one of BP’s major rivals! The 1989 débâcle over the 
sale in Britain of the nuclear energy sector (it had to be shelved when the City 
made clear that it was not interested because of the risks involved) was no less 
politically embarrassing. The withdrawal, in November 1994, of the sale of 25 per 
cent of OTE, the Greek telecommunications monopoly, because of the state of the 
international financial markets, took place only one day after parliament had nar­
rowly authorised the sale. It provides another example of the fiasco phenomenon. 
So, too, does the bungled plan to privatize the Italian telecommunications sector in 
1994-95.
- policy dilemma: being forced to choose between conflicting, and sometimes un­
palatable, options. An excellent illustration occurred in March 1995 in Britain at 
the time of the sale of the government’s remaining 40 per cent stake in the coun­
try’s two major electricity power generators. Five days before the sale, the gov­
ernment learnt that the angry industry’s regulator was seriously considering the 
imposition of a more stringent price regime on the privatized electricity companies. 
The dilemma was acute: to postpone the sale would have been immensely costly in 
monetary (a major privatization involves vast expense) and political terms, to con­
tinue the sale but inform the public of the regulator’s possible intervention would
17 Peter Saunders and Colin Harris, op. cit.





























































































have led to a collapse in the price of the shares (and government receipts), to pur­
sue the flotation without informing the public was fraught with political dangers. 
The government chose the third option. The regulator’s report was published the 
day after the privatization, resulting in a dramatic fall in the share price (£3.5 billion 
or 12 per cent was wiped off the stock market value of the industry), immediate 
losses for over one million small investors and some major institutional investors, 
threats of legal action, and a huge political embarrassment. At a more general level, 
privatization confronts many governments with dilemmas because of the follow­
ing phenomenon.
- policy contradictions: the pursuit of conflicting goals within a particular pro­
gramme or between programmes. This feature is common in many policy areas, and 
privatization is no exception. Let us briefly mention four such contradictions. 
Firstly, ‘popular capitalism’ - giving people a share in the economy - has involved 
the creation of many new shareholders (in the United Kingdom, France, Portugal 
and even Italy and Germany) but no attempt has been made to grant any power to 
these shareholders. Secondly, privatization is frequently presented as a pedagogi­
cal exercise designed to sensitise citizens to the workings of the market, but selling 
shares to a mass public at below market price is unlikely to have this effect. Third, 
privatization has been presented as a mechanism of efficiency and competition, yet 
all privatizing governments have devised a battery of measures designed to limit 
the impact of competition: indeed, they have deliberately sought to protect some 
of their major privatized enterprises from market forces (see below). Finally, the 
major motive for privatization has been budgetary - the need to raise money - yet 
most of the share prices of the big flotations have been politically fixed at below 
market value to ensure their success.
- policy perversity: the unintended and sometimes unwelcome consequences of a 
policy. Once again, privatization perfectly illustrates the phenomenon. The pur­
chase of British privatized stock by foreign (often French and public) enterprises - 
‘nationalisation by foreigners and through the back door’ - provides the first 
example of policy perversity: a recent example is the bid, in March 1995, by Lyon- 
naise des Eaux for Northumbrian Water, one of the twelve privatized regional 
water companies. A second example of policy perversity is provided by Italy 
where the privatization of a significant part of the banking sector in 1993 led to 
the strengthening of the power of an already over-powerful financial actor - 
Mediobanca - which is precisely what the government was trying to avoid. At a 
more general level, privatization has been advocated as a means of clarifying the 
relationship between the state and its major firms whereas, for a variety of reasons, 
it has led to greater obfuscation: privatized firms have become increasingly 
hybridized, characterised by the interpenetration of national and international 
capital and of public and private interests (see below). Finally, privatization has 
been advocated as a means of reducing the role of the state in industry. However, 
as we shall see below, some privatized firms may be even more effectively moni­
tored, if not directly controlled, than they were under public ownership - not a 




























































































It would be easy to write an article on each of the above policy features of 
privatization. However, the purpose of the article is to focus on another policy 
feature - policy paradox. Nevertheless, it is important to keep these other fea­
tures in mind, for they sometimes help to explain the many paradoxes evident 
in the various privatization programmes carried out in Western Europe.
III. The Paradoxes of Privatization
Perhaps the policy phenomenon most clearly illustrated by industrial priva­
tization is the policy paradox: ‘a statement contrary to received opinion, 
seemingly absurd though, perhaps well founded’ according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary. In truth, some of the paradoxes are country or sector 
specific and may be ephemeral or transient in nature. Some are more apparent 
than real. Some, however, raise very complex questions for policy makers, 
since they appear to be inherent in industrial privatization and highlight the 
conflicting pressures and tensions evident in the process.
The first paradox lies in the nature of political partisan support for privati­
zation. Some right-wing parties have been hostile or sceptical (such as the MSI 
in Italy or the CSU in Bavaria) while left-wing parties in countries such as 
Spain and France have pursued fairly extensive partial privatization pro­
grammes. Thus, French Socialist governments, between 1982 and 1986, sold 
off numerous subsidiaries of public-sector industrial holding companies - the 
policy of respiration - and indulged in periodic sales of minority stakes in 
important public enterprises such as Total, Elf-Aquitaine, Rhone-Poulenc and 
CLF. Inspite of Mitterrand’s election pledge of 1988 that his presidency would 
be characterised by a policy of ‘ni-ni’ (ni nationalisations, ni privatisations), 
‘back-door privatization’ continued. Thus, in 1992, the state’s stake in Total 
was reduced from 34 to 15 per cent, and a further tranche of Elf-Aquitaine 
was sold. Between December 1991 and May 1993 (when the right returned to 
office), the French Socialists raised FF 8 billion from sales of minority stakes.
A second political paradox is that several socialist governments, in the name 
of ‘modernisation’ and the need to conform to the exigencies of the single 
European market, carried out extensive policies of liberalisation and financial 
market deregulation and expansion, thus greatly facilitating privatization poli­
cies (in some cases, of their right-wing successors). The same socialist gov­
ernments also granted public-sector managers greater autonomy to make their 




























































































The third paradox, connected to the previous one, relates to ‘crowding-out’: 
the more successful privatization becomes as a policy option the more difficult 
it may be to implement. All governments, with the exception of those of the 
United Kingdom and France, must be sensitive to the capacity of the domestic 
- and even international - financial markets to absorb massive privatization 
programmes. A clear indication of the problem came in 1989 with the privati­
zation of the British water companies - a huge financial operation - the impact 
of which was to oblige the Spanish government to sell a stake in Repsol, the 
state oil company, smaller than originally intended (Financial Times, 23 May 
1991). With the gathering pace of privatization the problem of crowding out 
can only be aggravated. In 1994, for instance, West European governments 
sold more than 120 companies valued at some £40 billion, a programme which 
threatened to overwhelm the appetites of investors. It is instructive that in 
summer 1994 international investors had some difficulty in digesting two big 
insurance flotations in France (AGF) and Italy (INA). An estimated $80 to 
$150 billion worth of new privatized equity will flow into the markets 
between 1995 and 1999 - and most in four sectors (telecommunications, utili­
ties, energy and insurance). With too much stock and too concentrated in lim­
ited sectors, there is a real danger, according to some financial advisers, of 
market saturation (Economist, 7 May 1994, 13 August 1994).
The role of public sector industrial managers as one of the principal motors 
of privatization provides the fourth paradox. In much of the neo-liberal and 
public choice literature, they are depicted as intrinsically inefficient, and 
derive job satisfaction from their political contacts, their respectable salaries, 
their strategies of budget maximisation or bureau expansion, the advantages of 
civil service status, and the knowledge that they are sheltered from the rigours 
of competition and protected from hostile take-overs. This was always a cari­
cature of the general situation - even though in some Southern European 
countries the description may be apt. The various privatization programmes 
have revealed the crucial role of public sector managers in preparing for and 
advocating privatization - although in some cases in the United Kingdom they 
have ensured that the monopolistic or dominant position of their firm be pro­
tected after privatization! Some public managers see the sale of subsidiaries 
and of minority stakes as a means of strengthening their empires by divesting 
them of non-core activities and by raising capital. Some, such as Romano 
Prodi in Italy (IRI) and Jurgen Weber in Germany (Lufthansa), have insisted 
on the need for wide-ranging privatization, restructuring, rationalisation 
(through the sale of subsidiaries), and competition as part of a wider strategy 
of reshaping and modernising national capitalism. Others, such as Lord King 




























































































(British Steel) introduced a private-sector logic into their enterprises long 
before official privatization, making them highly competitive and profitable19.
A fifth policy paradox concerns the European Union. Privatization corre­
sponds closely to the logic, if not to the letter, of the Treaty of Rome and of 
the single market, if only because it may (and does) become an impediment to 
the free flow of capital. Yet, privatization is most enthusiastically pursued by 
the British government which, in its public rhetoric, is the most hostile about 
the European Union. Zealous advocates of the European cause (such as the 
Greek and Italian governments), on the other hand, have often been singularly 
reticent about full-scale privatization. Furthermore, the greater the degree of 
privatization and deregulation at the national level - essential preconditions for 
European market integration - the greater is the need for reregulation at the 
European level. Paradoxically, the British government, which is always com­
plaining about ‘the bureaucrats of Brussels’ is constantly demanding, in the 
name of reciprocity and ‘a level playing field’, European Commission or 
European Court intervention to ensure some sort of equality of treatment 
between its own privatized firms and the public sector competitor of its neigh­
bours. Thus, when Alitalia, Air France or Iberia are given yet another capital 
injection by their respective states, the British government, on behalf of 
British Airways, demands Commission action20. The reaction of the Commis­
sion, which is divided and politicised, to competition-distorting aid to public 
sector firms has been inconsistent, incoherent and has sometimes appeared 
incomprehensible: certainly, the competition regime of privatized firms within 
the European Union remains unpredictable, and this unpredictability is often 
compounded by the nature of national regulatory regimes - a point to which 
we shall return. However, there is no doubt that the European Union is slowly 
imposing a regulatory framework upon many sectors, with the help of pro­
competition governments such as the British.
Paradox six: privatization has often been presented as a means of strength­
ening national industry, but has, in several cases, merely facilitated takeovers 
by foreign companies. Indeed, several governments have not hesitated in sell­
ing public assets to foreign companies. Thus, the Spanish government in the 
mid-1980s sold SEAT to the Germans, the SKF ball-bearing plant to SKF 
Sweden, Puralator (a filter manufacturer) to the West German company AG in
19 Douglas Pitt, ‘An Essentially Contestable Organisation: British Telecom and the Privatiza­
tion Debate’, in J.J. Richardson (ed.). Privatization and Deregulation in Canada and 
Britain, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1990.
20 On this question see Konstanune Gatsios and Paul Seabright, ‘Regulation in the European 




























































































1986, Secornsa to Figitsu, MTM to Alstom-France, Enfersa to the Kuwaiti 
Investment Office, and ENSA (a truck maker) to Fiat. The widening of the 
international and European capital base of national industry has been encour­
aged or tolerated by many governments, even those, such as the French, which 
were traditionally hostile to foreign capital penetration. Thus, by the end of 
1991, in France, foreigners held stakes of 11.5 per cent in Saint Gobain, 14.5 
per cent in Paribas and 16.5 per cent in CCF - all privatized enterprises, and 
after 1993, the Balladur government introduced foreigners into the stable core 
shareholders (noyaux durs) of the newly privatized groups (see below). For­
eign penetration, takeovers or alliances will be an inevitable process in sectors 
which are heavily rationalising such as telecommunications (British Telecom 
has a clearly stated and ambitious global strategy and has already linked up 
with MCI, the American long-distance carrier, whilst France Télécom and 
Deutsche Telekom have negotiated a highly controversial joint venture, suspi­
ciously regarded in Brussels, to supply a range of telecommunication services, 
and hope for a second-stage link with Sprint, another American long-distance 
carrier), air transport and aeronautics (where there has been a flurry of merg­
ers and acquisitions as well as investment and research alliances and joint ven­
tures) and the automobile industry in which, for example, the privatized Rover 
group, after a brief flirtation with the Japanese, is now in the hands of BMW, 
the German car manufacturer. Other examples in Britain of privatized firms 
falling into foreign hands include Sealink Ferries which is now part of a 
Swedish group, the short-term export-credit insurance business of the Exports 
Credits Guarantee Department which, after privatization, was sold in 1992 to 
NCM, a Dutch group, and a small number of water companies which have 
been acquired by the French group Lyonnaise des Eaux. The danger of for­
eign takeover is, of course, heightened in European countries with inadequate 
financial markets or national institutional investors. And several governments, 
such as the French, the British, the Portuguese and the Italian, sensitive to 
nationalistic sentiment, have attempted to erect legal barricades against foreign 
penetration or takeovers of privatized Firms (see below). Nevertheless, many 
of these barricades are either temporary, ineffective (thus, Spanish banks, 
through a policy of buying subsidiaries in Portugal, are quickly taking over 
that country’s banking sector inspité of legal prohibitions) or are likely to 
become ineffective. Most European countries involved in major privatizations 
have recourse to the international capital markets, and sales take place simulta­
neously in the home financial market, London, New York and Tokyo. The 
internationalisation and liberalisation of financial circuits, the exigencies of the 
European open market, the multinationalisation of firms as well as the capital 




























































































to render obsolete the juridical obstacles placed by governments to prevent 
privatized firms from losing their nation identities21.
There are, finally, four other major interconnected paradoxes which lie at 
the heart of privatization: the efficiency-competition paradox; the state inter­
ventionist paradox; the state withdrawal paradox; and the regulation paradox.
The efficiency-competition paradox may be stated briefly: privatization has 
often been advocated as a means of enhancing efficiency and competition. But 
the privatization programmes clearly underline, firstly, the complexity of the 
links between ownership, efficiency and competition. Secondly they reveal the 
limits to, and constraints upon competition imposed by privatizing govern­
ments. Let us consider each dimension of this paradox in turn. This is not the 
place to address the complex question of the relative degree of efficiency of 
public and private firms - it has already generated a vast (and controversial 
literature). However, two points are worth considering. Firstly, many private 
firms were nationalized because they had become bankrupt, and many were 
transformed into highly efficient firms under public ownership - the cases of 
Rolls Royce in the United Kingdom and of Usinor-Sacilor, the French steel 
group - spring to mind. Secondly, many public enterprises made enormous 
efficiency gains during state ownership: indeed, their successful privatization 
hinged on such gains. In truth, there are great difficulties in comparing the 
performance of public and private enterprises, because there are the inherent 
problems of isolating the ownership variable from a host of other factors 
which bear on performance and because the criteria for assessing performance 
may differ sharply: for example, low profitability is not necessarily inconsis­
tent with efficient management. A 1995 study by Bishop and Green of British 
privatized utilities suggests that, on the basis of TFP (total factor productivity, 
which measures the relationship between the physical outputs of firms (for 
example, the number of telephone calls completed) and the physical inputs 
(capital, labour, materials) needed to provide them, growth varied consider­
ably, with British Telecom enjoying high productivity and British Gas low 
productivity - lower than that achieved by public-sector groups such as the 
Post Office, British Coal and British Rail (Economist, 11 March 1995). The 
weight of evidence suggests that the nature of competition in the relevant sec­
tor is an important factor for efficiency, with private ownership appearing, on 
balance, to be relatively more efficient in competitive conditions. However,
2 ' Vincent Wright, ‘The State and Major Enterprises in Western Europe: Enduring Complexi­
ties’, in Jack Hayward (ed.). Industrial Enterprise and European Integration, Oxford, 




























































































this brings us to the second dimension of the efficiency-competition paradox - 
that privatizing governments have placed constraints on competition.
In the first place, many governments are still reluctant or unable to priva­
tize utility monopolies such as gas, water, electricity and telecommunications, 
and when they have done so, as in the United Kingdom, they have either pro­
tected their monopolistic position or ensured for them a dominant market 
position, and have, in all cases, insisted on the retention of social welfare obli­
gations. Secondly, privatization often involves the sale of only subsidiaries or 
part of the equity of the public enterprise. Thirdly, even when only a minority 
stake is retained, it is sometimes invested, as in Belgium, with veto rights. 
Fourthly, governments have frequently imposed ceilings on the percentage of 
shares available to individual or insdtudonal investors. Fifthly, caps have often 
been placed on the proportion of shares that foreigners can acquire (the figure 
varies from 15 to 49.5 per cent) in ‘strategic’ or defence related industries. 
Somedmes these caps are merely temporary (the case in France with the 
Chirac privatization programme of 1986 to 1988), and somedmes they are 
adjusted upwards (thus, the Portuguese government raised the threshold on 
total direct foreign ownership in several privatized industries from 10 per cent 
to 20 per cent and then to 35 per cent, whilst the UK government adjusted the 
foreign ownership cap on privatized Rolls Royce from 14.9 per cent to 29.5 
per cent). It is also clear that in some cases the ceiling on foreign stakes has 
been violated - most notably in Portugal where the privatized banking sector 
has fallen increasingly under the direct or indirect control of the Spanish, and 
where a key part of the oil sector is falling into the hands of Total, the French 
group (Economist, Financial Times, 21 January 1994). However, in many 
countries the ceiling on foreign stakes is indefinite in duration (the case in the 
Balladur programme) and countries such as the United Kingdom have insisted 
on protecting or trying to protect their national industries against foreign 
predators: for instance, in 1987, the Kuwait Investment Office reduced its 21.6 
percent stake in privatized BP after the government referred it to the Mergers 
and Monopolies Commission, whilst the government forced an American 
investor to reduce its stake in British Aerospace after it breached the 29.5 per­
cent foreign ownership limit (Independent, 21 May 1994). The sixth major 
constraint imposed by governments on market competition lies in their attempt 
to structure the shareholding to prevent hostile takeovers. Almost all govern­
ments have retained a ‘golden share’ in those privatized industries which they 
might wish to defend, and several governments, including the French and 
Italian governments, have resorted on occasion to the creation in many priva­
tized enterprises of a group of key institutional shareholders, chosen by the 




























































































vatized stock. Thus, when the Banque Nationale de Paris was privatized, no 
fewer than sixteen friendly institutional shareholders were allocated a total of 
30 per cent of the stock. This core shareholding - noyau dur or nocciolo duro 
- is intended to forge strategic links with the privatized company and protect it 
against hostile takeover bids - in other words, against competitive market 
forces. Initially, in France, all the core shareholders were French (and many 
were close to the Gaullist party), but the Balladur programme has introduced 
major foreign enterprises into the ownership of privatized groups. Finally, as 
noted below, by a variety of means to ensure continuing state influence, priva­
tized firms are shielded from the full force of competition.
Another aspect of the competition paradox is that privatization frequently 
leads to greater concentration rather than to greater competition. This is most 
visible in the industrial and banking sectors of Portugal and of Italy where 
there are only a very few big institutional and family-based industrial 
investors. The Banco Totta e Acores, privatized in 1989, has extended its hold 
over the Portuguese banking sector. And, in Italy, Mediobanco, the Milan 
merchant bank, has increased its influence over the country’s financial system 
through its connections with the former state banks, Banca Commerciale 
Italiana and Credito Italiano. In 1995, it was also involved in an attempt to 
take over part of the telecommunications sector. But it may also be seen in the 
United Kingdom where BP has absorbed Britoil, BA has swallowed British 
Caledonian and then Dan Air, National Express has consolidated its hold on 
national bus transport and where British Aerospace acquired the privatized 
Rover group. In all cases, die assent of the pro-market Conservative govern­
ment was required. In France, privatization has resulted in the strengthening 
of already powerful groups. The insurance group UAP provides a perfect 
example: by the end of 1994 it held stakes in Générale des Eaux, Paribas, Saint 
Gobain, Alcatel-Alstom, Elf-Aquitaine, BSN, Lyonnaise des Eaux, Air Liq­
uide, Bouygues, BNP and Suez (it was the largest shareholder), and it was part 
of an extensive and complex pattern of reciprocal shareholdings which was 
designed to provide some protection against the market (Le Monde, 13 April 
1994, Economist, 17 September 1994).
The state interventionist paradox goes to the heart of privatization: a radical 
reduction in the role of the state, through privatization (liberalisation and 
deregulation), requires strong state interventionism. Political will, political 




























































































policy implementation22. in the United Kingdom the Thatcher government, 
elected in 1979, was ideally placed to push through privatization, and not only 
because the country had an extensive public sector to privatize, but also 
because the public sector was in the hands of the central state (in several 
countries many public utilities such as gas, water and electricity are under 
local control). Moreover, the United Kingdom has the biggest and best organ­
ised financial market in Europe, with major institutional investors and a tradi­
tional investment culture: this is certainly not the case in most West European 
countries. Of no less significance, however, has been the political situation of 
the United Kingdom since 1979:
- British Conservative governments since 1979 have defined ambitious 
privatization programmes as part of a wider economic political and ideological 
strategy, and have pursued this strategy with vigour and tenacity. Most other 
governments, with the exceptions of the Chirac government of 1986, the Greek 
New Democracy, the Swedish Conservative coalition government, and the 
Portuguese Social Democratic government, have been prudent privatizers inspired 
largely by budgetary considerations.
- British Conservative governments since 1979 have enjoyed continuity and dura­
bility - essential characteristics for the pursuit of radical policies. The only other 
radical privatizing government to enjoy such conditions was the Cavaco-Silva 
government in Portugal. Other radical privatizing governments - the Chirac gov­
ernment in France, and the right-wing governments in Sweden and Greece - were 
very short-lived.
- Constitutional and juridical constraints in Britain are non-existent. This is certainly 
not the case elsewhere. There would, for instance, be constitutional and legal 
questions raised in France by the privatization of public sector monopolies such as 
France Télécom. The privatization programmes of Chirac (1986-1988) and of 
Balladur (post-1993) were given the blessing of the Constitutional Council, even 
though it did insist on some modifications in the methods of privatization. Yet, it is 
revealing that Chirac and Balladur prudently avoided any attempt to privatize gas, 
electricity and telecommunications. In November 1993, the Conseil d’Etat de­
clared that the employees of France Télécom carried out ‘missions de service pub­
lic’, which implied that a majority of the capital had to remain in the hands of the 
state. The decision suggests that partial privatization is permissible (Nouvel 
Economist, 16 December 1994). Constitutional problems clearly slowed down or 
limited the privatization process in Germany. Not only are public utilities and even 
some public enterprises wholly or partially controlled by local authorities, but the 
public status of telecommunications, postal services and the railways are protected 
by the constitution. It took several years of politically delicate negotiations with 2





























































































the trade unions and the Social Democratic opposition (which came to gain a ma­
jority in the Bundesrat and was thus in a position to veto any constitutional pro­
posal) before the Kohl government - one of exceptional durability by West Euro­
pean standards - could pass the necessary privatization legislation for Deutsche 
Telekom. The same lengthy process is now engaged for the postal services and the 
railways. Constitutional constraints were most apparent in Portugal. Its very 
extensive public sector had been created during the early revolutionary phase of 
democratic transition, and was given constitutional protection: nationalisations 
were declared to constitute ‘an irreversible victory for the working class’. It re­
quired several years with the Socialist opposition before the irreversible was re­
versed and the necessary constitutional amendments were voted in parliament23.
- In Britain, privatizing governments have been unvariably united on privatization, 
and have enjoyed a single party majority in parliament and the overwhelming 
support of the majority party. Only the proposed privatization of 51 per cent of 
the Post Office ran into serious difficulties, when several Conservative Members of 
Parliament voted with the political opposition, in 1994, in order to reject the gov­
ernment’s proposal. But this was very exceptional. In Portugal and in France, too, 
conservative governments have faced no effective opposition to privatization 
either within the government or the majority coalition. Elsewhere in Western 
Europe, governments and right-wing coalitions have either been lukewarm or 
divided over radical privatization. The battles in the Berlusconi government over 
privatization mirrored those in previous Italian governments and in governments 
elsewhere in Europe: there were, for instance, major conflicts within the Kohl gov­
ernment over the privatization of Lufthansa, in the Gonzales government over the 
partial privatization of Telefònica, and the Papandreou government over the par­
tial privatization of OTE, the country’s telecoms monopoly.
- The British Conservative governments could count on the weakness of left-wing 
political and trades unions opposition, since, throughout the 1980s, both were 
weakened, demoralised and on the defensive. In several instances, the government 
was able to ignore trade union leaders’ opposition to privatization by buying the 
support of their members through the issue of cheap shares to employees. Again, 
this lack of effective political opposition has not been the case in many other 
European countries: the left has either been in power or in coalition or entrenched 
at local level (where many public services are controlled), and the trades unions 
are often strategically placed to slow down the privatization process: thus, in 
France and in Germany, trade union support has been needed to change the civil 
service status of some public service workers. The political left and the trades
23 On the constitutional and legal dimensions of privatization, see the excellent article by 
Terence Daintith, ‘The Legal Techniques of Privatization’, in Thomas Clarke (ed.). Inter­
national Privatizations: Strategies and Practices, Berlin De Gruyter, 1994, pp. 43-75; on 
the German case, see Gunner Folke Schuppert, ‘La privatisation des chemins de fer et de 
la poste en Allemagne: examen d’un repli par étapes de l’Etat’, in Institut International 





























































































unions have also sometimes been able to mobilise wider coalitions to slow down 
or limit privatization programmes: the Balladur government’s problems over the 
privatization of Renault, of Air France and of Aérospatiale - all politically sensitive 
public enterprises - can be partly attributed to this fact. So, too, can the failure of 
the Greek government to privatize even a minority stake in the country’s 
telecommunications monopoly.
But it is not only the political will and durability of governments as well as 
the absence of constraints which explain the success of the British privatization 
programmes. Four other political factors must also be considered:
- a willingness to adapt a conflictual confrontation style of policy making to push 
through the programme. Contrast this with the German situation where a negoti­
ated process has dominated the programmes. Interestingly, even in East Germany 
the initial brutal phase of privatizing state enterprises by the Treuhand was 
quickly replaced by a more traditional consensual mode of decision making24. 
Similarly, the Balladur government learned that confrontational politics might be 
very counter-productive for the pursuit of his privatization ambitions.
- a capacity to restructure existing policy networks to facilitate the implementation 
of the programmes - either by excluding or marginalising opponents (trades unions 
and middle managers), or by reinforcing existing or including new pro-privatiza­
tion actors (public-sector bosses, financial interests, right-wing ideologies)25.
- a systematic attempt to overcome widespread public disquiet or even hostility (the 
privatization of water, gas and electricity were, and remain, vastly unpopular 
according to all opinion polls) by a policy of selling privatized stock to a mass 
public - at below market price. This policy of selling privatized stock too cheaply 
has been seriously criticised (notably by the House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee which has a Conservative party majority), but it has proved highly suc­
cessful, since the number of shareholders has increased from two to thirteen mil­
lion. France and now other countries have also appreciated the political advan­
tages from such a policy. The advantages may, however, be short-term or fluctuat­
ing, according to the state of the financial markets.
- the constant recourse to a legitimising discourse for the programme. This discourse 
has two distinct elements. The negative element is explicitly anti-statist and ex­
ploits the poor image of the public sector. The positive elements lay stress on effi­
ciency, entrepreneurship, individual property rights, freedom, and, increasingly, the
24 Josef Esser, ‘Germany: Symbolic Privatizations in a Social Market Economy’, in V. 
Wright, op. cit., pp. 118-121.
25 Stuart Butler, ‘Changing the Political Dynamics of Government’, in Steve H. Hanke (ed.). 
Prospects for Privatization, New York, Academy of Political Science, 1987, pp. 10-11; 
J.J. Richardson, W. Maloney and W. Rudig, ‘The Dynamics of Policy Change: Lobbying 




























































































need for modernisation and adjustment to the changing demands of the interna­
tional market. With the exception of the Chirac government of 1986-1988, no
other government has developed such a wide and coherent legitimising strategy.
The British case suggests, therefore, that radical privatization may require a 
strong state not only in terms of being unconstrained or of defining radical 
ambitions, but also in actively laying the necessary political groundwork. 
Other countries have found themselves much more constrained, either consti­
tutionally or politically, in pursuing ambitions which are more limited.
The state has to prepare not only the political environment for privatization. 
It is also required to establish the industrial and financial preconditions. At the 
industrial level, the state must become involved in the privatization process at 
several levels. In the event of off-market sales, it must find suitable purchasers 
- and this has not always proved easy. In 1989, the British government found 
it impossible to sell the nuclear energy industry, and in Italy, Merril Lynch 
was hired in October 1992 by the government to find a big domestic or for­
eign buyer to absorb part or whole of IRI’s holding, but none could be 
tempted to make an offer. The Portuguese government failed to sell a bank, a 
cement producer and a steel company in April 1993 because the bids were too 
low or non existent (Financial Times, 14 April 1994). The privatization of 
British Coal was slowed down by the same problem: the problem was resolved 
by the government granting an unsecured loan to the purchaser at a time when 
it was unavailable in the financial market - an act which has provoked an offi­
cial parliamentary investigation (Independent, 6 April 1995). In some cases - 
irrespective of the method of privatization - the state is obliged to provide new 
management, deregulate the sector, and restructure the major holding groups. 
This has been the case in France, Spain, and in Italy: hence, the creation of 
Telecom Italia in May 1994, involving the merger of Sip, the major domestic 
network operator, and four other state companies, as a precondition for the 
sale of the state’s shareholding in Stet, the national telecommunications utility. 
Often a particular enterprise has to be restructured before privatizations. The 
most extreme example is that of British Rail which has now been split into 27 
separate ‘profit centres’ to provide the basis for businesses for franchising, in 
an operation which even friends of the government concede to be a gigantic 
mess. Other tasks of the state before privatization include changing the legal 
status of public groups into joint stock companies, establishing or rebalancing 
the pricing structure of the industry (hence, the inflated increases in gas and 
electricity tariffs in Britain to increase profits and facilitate privatization, and 
the May 1995 promises on future rail fares to calm angry public opinion), and 




























































































such as France and Germany). More importantly, rendering a firm privatiz- 
able may require expensive redundancy programmes for the workers (hence, 
the French government’s promise to continue a state-financed early retirement 
benefits scheme for workers after privatization in order to gain the support of 
the unions for the denationalisation of Usinor-Sacilor), the writing off of debts 
and massive recapitalisation programmes for the enterprises - which invari­
ably provoke the anger of foreign rivals and the suspicion of the European 
Commission. The politically controversial French aid packages to Groupe 
Bull, Air France, Renault and Crédit Lyonnais, which are a prelude to privati­
zation, have to gain the backing of the Commission (and probably of the 
European Court).
Preparing for privatization may, therefore, be an immensely time-consum­
ing and expensive exercise requiring constant state intervention: Thomson's 
restructuring programme required FF 8 billion in 1993; redundancy payments 
and fees to outside advisors in the British Rail privatization programme cost 
the British government an estimated £650 million (Observer, 1 May 1994). It 
may also be politically dangerous. The restructuring plan of Air France led to 
angry strikes, undignified government retreat, the resignation of the chairman 
of the company, and a slowing down of the privatization process. Similarly, in 
the same year, the planned closures of coal mines in Britain, as a condition for 
privatization of the industry, triggered a trades union and parliamentary 
uproar which pushed the government into (temporary) retreat.
The state is also inevitably involved in preparing the financial preconditions 
and conditions for privatization. Firstly, local stock exchanges must often be 
modernised, deregulated and expanded, and campaigns to ‘raise equity aware­
ness’ organised. Paradoxically, therefore, the state may have to strengthen the 
private sector before it can pursue a successful privatization programme. Sec­
ondly, the state must choose the financial advisors (for the immensely lucrative 
Deutsche Telekom sale more than twenty international banks were in competi­
tion [Economist, 1 October 1994]) and, if needs be, underwriters for the vari­
ous privatizations, and it must also decide whether the stock should be floated 
simultaneously on the local and international financial markets. Thirdly, the 
state must decide on the method of privatization of an enterprise: off-market 
sale to another company? sale by tender? fixed price offer? worker or man­
agement buy-out? a public flotation, and, if so, of a majority or minority of 
the stock? and at what price? Fourthly, the state must decide the timing of the 
privatization - an intrinsically difficult decision given the frequently turbulent 




























































































Finally, the state must define the future market situation of a privatized 
company - in terms of market position and of ownership. The question of the 
future market position of a privatized enterprise arises most acutely when the 
firm enjoys a dominant or monopolistic position. Quite simply, should the 
firm be split up? What degree of deregulation in the sector should be encour­
aged or imposed? What regulatory framework should be devised if the 
monopolistic position is retained? Defining future ownership raises very deli­
cate political questions: should a cap be place on foreign stakes, and at what 
level, or for how long? Should a proportion of the shares be reserved for 
employees and the public? Should a ceiling be imposed on single institutional 
investors? Should a core of stable institutional investors be constituted? And 
how to ensure that legal stipulations are respected? Decisions on these issues 
have an impact on the structure of domestic capitalism, and, more immedi­
ately, on the value of the company to be privatized. For that reason all gov­
ernments have had to pay particular attention to them. The inability to dispose 
of IRI’s 61 per cent stake in Stet, the telecommunications holding company, in 
1995, was due to the government’s failure to define the future regulatory 
regime of the sector. Each major privatization is, therefore, a profoundly 
political act. The problem is that governments are often locked into reconcil­
ing irreconcilable objectives when pursuing their programmes - a point taken 
up in our conclusion. There is no doubt, however, that all governments have 
deliberately attempted to shape the structure of their domestic markets - often 
by market distorting and sometimes illegal privatization operations (for 
instance, the under-the-table financial inducements given to British Aerospace 
by the government to buy the Rover car group - even though the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee clearly demonstrated that the official 
price being paid was £56.5 million below market value and that bigger offers 
had been made ...).
The state is, therefore, constantly and intimately drawn into each major pri­
vatization, both before and during, because the stakes go beyond privatization 
itself. But, the state may also choose to, or is obliged to retain a relationship 
with an enterprise even after its privatization. This brings us to the state with­
drawal paradox: privatization is alleged to lead to ‘state retreat’ but it often 
merely underlines the limits to that retreat.
The limits of state withdrawal may be seen at two levels: the general and the 
specific. At the general level the state continues to have a massive impact on all 




























































































- monetary, budgetary and fiscal policies
- competition policy
- labour market policy
- education and training policies
- public infrastructure policies
- research and development policies
- public procurement policies (notably, 
but not exclusively, in the defence sector)
- energy policies
- environmental policies
- urban planning policies
- consumer protection policies
- health and safety policies
- international trade policies
- exports-supports policies.
Whilst the nation state may be increasingly constrained by internationalisa­
tion, multinationalisation, liberalisation and Communitarianisation, it remains 
a central actor in determining the fate of most major national firms - even 
after privatization. The continuing troubled relationship between the British 
government and the privatized British Airways perfectly illustrates the inex­
tricably linked nature of the relations between governments and their major 
firms26.
The limits to state withdrawal may also be seen at the specific level of pri­
vatization. And in a variety of ways:
- the reluctance or inability to privatize public utility monopolies - only Germany, 
Britain and Portugal, have gone down this path (although the Portuguese have no 
intention of denationalising the postal services, the railways or the national airline). 
France, a radical privatizer, has explicitly ruled out the denationalisation of France 
Télécom and of the railways.
- the widespread policy of partial privatization, involving the retention of a majority 
of shares (the policy generally pursued in Spain) or of a blocking minority (the 
policy of the Belgium government for strategic industries).
26 Thus, British Airways was allowed to consolidate its dominant market position by absorb­
ing two of its small competitors. However, relations soured in 1991 when, as the result of 
a trade liberalisation deal with the USA, the British government allocated some of British 
Airways’ slots at Heathrow airport to American carriers. The firm responded by cancelling 




























































































- the right of the state to veto the sale of shares above the threshold defined by the 
privatization legislation, or in certain sectors if it is judged to be ‘against the na­
tional interest’.
- the retention of a ‘golden share’ or action spécifique, which confers upon the 
state certain veto rights ‘to protect the national interest’. The British, French, Por­
tuguese and Italian governments have all retained a golden share in the major pri­
vatized strategic industries - although the duration and conditions of the share 
vary from country to country, have differed in the same country (in France, the 
Chirac government limited their applicability to five years whilst the Balladur gov­
ernment made them of indefinite duration), and may change according to the sec­
tor in each country (the case in Britain). Nor is it clear when the veto would be 
used: in the United Kingdom the government has a golden share in ten major pri­
vatized companies, but it has yet to exploit it (even the much criticised BP 
takeover of Britoil was tolerated). More left-wing or nationalistic governments 
may discover in the golden share a useful instrument of dirigisme ...
- the right of the state to appoint directors (in some rare cases, a majority) to the 
board of directors in major privatized firms - a right used everywhere in Western 
Europe, although the role of these state appointed directors varies enormously 
from country to country.
- the continuing role played by managers appointed by the state before privatiza­
tion. It is worth noting that in France a great majority of privatized enterprise man­
agers have been recruited from the state sector: this was the case, at the beginning 
of 1995, of ten of the eleven major privatized firms, almost all of whom were prod­
ucts of the Ecole Polytechnique or the Ecole Nationale d’ Administration and the 
grands corps de l ’Etat. The process of pantouflage, involving the appointment of 
politically sensitive public officials to head private financial and industrial groups, 
is one of the distinguishing characteristics of French capitalism, and has, in no way, 
been weakened by privatization27.
- through the regulation of the: general environment and activities of the privatized 
enterprises, and the continuing ability to regulate the regulators.
This last point brings us to the final paradox of privatization: the regulation 
paradox28. All West European firms are increasingly caught in a series of 
concentric circles of regulation, of a direct and indirect nature: international, 
European Union and national. Deregulation in one direction has been accom­
panied by regulation and reregulation in other directions. This is not the place
27 Michael Bauer and Bénédicte Bertin-Mourpt, Les Enarques en Entreprise de 1960 à 1990: 
Trente Ans de Pantouflage, Paris, CNRS, 1994.
28 I am greatly indebted to the work of Giandominico Majone on this paradox. See especially 
his ‘Paradoxes of Privatization and Deregulation’, Journal o f European Public Policy, Vol.




























































































to explore all the ramifications of ‘the rise of the regulatory state’29 or even 
the barrage of regulatory controls that now constrain all firms - public or pri­
vate. Suffice to state that privatization does not release the firm from those 
controls. Moreover, and here lies the paradox, privatization may even entail 
increased state regulation - albeit of an indirect nature. This is the case in the 
United Kingdom for certain sectors, and is likely to be the case elsewhere in 
Western Europe when monopolistic or dominant firms are transferred to the 
private sector with their market positions largely intact. Without a regulatory 
framework in place international investors are unlikely to be enthusiastic pur­
chasers of privatized stock (Financial Times, 31 January 1995) on the privati­
zation of Deutsche Telekom and the British electricity generators). The United 
Kingdom government gave inadequate thought to competition when it priva­
tized gas, water, electricity and telecommunications, and it defined vague and 
loose regulatory regimes for each of them. A semi-autonomous regulatory 
agency was established (OFGAS [1986], OFFER [1990], OFTEL [1984], 
OFWAT [1989]) for each sector whose attributions and decisions were subject 
to the control of the minister. The agencies have been much criticised for be­
ing too gentle with the regulated industries, especially over quality, high divi­
dends, prices, and the escalating salaries of the top managers. And, in some 
cases, accusations of regulatory laxity appear to be justified. Yet, there is no 
doubt that the general tendency has been towards a widening and deepening of 
the regulatory net - motivated by the competitive zeal of some regulators and 
by sustained political pressures. This political pressure was such that Prime 
Minister Major was obliged, in September 1994, to organise a meeting of key 
ministers to discuss government policy towards the privatized utilities and
29 Giandominico Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’, West European Politics, Vol. 
17 (3), July 1994, pp. 77-101. See also, Gary Fromm (ed.). Studies in Public Regulation, 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981; Elizabeth E. Bailey (ed.). Public Regulation. New 
Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1987; John 
Francis, The Politics o f Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1993; Giandominico Majone (ed.). Deregulation or Regulation? Regulatory Reform in 
Europe and the US, London, Pinter Publishers, 1990; L. Hancher and M. Moran (eds.). 
Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; C. 
Graham and T. Prosser, Privatizing Public Enterprises: Constitutions, the State and Regu­
lation in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991; A. Peacock (ed.). The 
Regulation Game: How British and West German Companies Bargain with Government, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989; Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas (eds.), Making 
Regulatory Policy, Pittsburgh, P.A., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989; on regulation 
at the European Union level see Konstantine Gatsios and Paul Seabright, op. cite, G. 
Majone, The European Community as a Regulatory State, Florence, Academy of European 
Law, 1994; Renaud Dehousse, ‘Integration v Regulation? On the Dynamics of Regulation 
in the European Community’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. XXX (4), 
December 1992, pp.381-402; and, of course, D. Vogel, National Styles o f Regulation, 




























































































their regulation (Sunday Times, 4 September 1994). There is certainly no evi­
dence of collusion or ‘capture’: rather, there is a fluid, politicised, even per­
sonalised and bargained game between actors with different resources30. Even 
on the critical issue of asymmetrical information, there is evidence to suggest 
that the regulators are slowly acquiring, sometimes with difficulty, greater 
knowledge of the various activities of their enterprises - and certainly more 
than ministers and their officials enjoyed before privatization. Indeed, one 
could legitimately argue that agency capture was sometimes more in evidence 
under public than under private ownership. The constant intervention of the 
regulatory agencies in an increasing number of activities of the privatized 
utilities has given rise to some spectacular public rows (notably in the gas and 
telecommunications industries), and it has even been suggested by the utilities, 
with some exaggeration, that the introduction of greater competition into each 
sector, together with the tightening of the regulatory screw are tantamount to 
a violation of the implicit contract on which privatization was based31. What is 
equally clear is that most of the major decisions relating to the regulated bod­
ies are carefully monitored by the government which has not hesitated, on oc­
casion, to mediate unofficially between the regulator and the regulated bodies 
(for example, in the public row between OFGAS and British gas in March 
1992) and periodically to exploit its official powers to redefine the regulatory 
regimes of each of the privatized utilities. Thus, one of the alleged advantages 
of privatization - the removal of key industries from the political agenda - has 
proved largely illusory32: as the Chairman of Thames Water, the biggest of 
the ten privatized water companies, declared, "the concern of the industry is 
that, without justification, and after too short a period, the regulator is heading 
in the direction of a role uncommonly like the government role of yesterday, 
both in substance and time scale" (Financial Times, 18 December 1991). Thus,
30 The best account is Mathew Bishop, John Kay and Colin Mayer (eds.), The Regulatory 
Challenge, Oxford, OUP, 1995; see also Michael Beesley, Regulating Utilities: the Way 
Forward, London, 1EA, 1994; Dan Corry, David Souter, Michael Waterson, Regulating 
our Utilities, London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 1994; John Kay and John 
Vickers, 'Regulatory Reform in Britain’, Economic Policy, 7, 1988, pp. 285-351; C.D. 
Foster, Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation o f a Natural Monopoly, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992.
31 This is one of the themes of Cento Veljanowski, Regulators and the Market, London, 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1991. See also his The Failure o f Industry Regulation in the 
United Kingdom, London, European Economic Forum, 1993.
32 Tony Prosser, Nationalized Industries and Public Control Legal, Constitutional and Polit­
ical Issues, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 74; Tony Prosser, ‘Regulation of Privatized 
Enterprises: Institutions and Procedures’, in L. Hancher and M. Moran, Capitalism, Cul­
ture and Economic Regulation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 147; William A. 
Maloney and Jeremy Richardson, ‘Post-privatization Regulation in Britain’, Politics, 12 
(2), 1992, pp. 14-20; Michael Moran and Tony Prosser, Privatization and Regulatory 




























































































just as left-wing governments paradoxically laid the ground for the privatiza­
tion programmes of their right-wing successors, so right-wing governments 
may be, through the emergence of effective regulatory agencies, providing 
their left-wing successors with future effective instruments of state interven­
tionism.
IV. Some Tentative Conclusions
A number of general conclusion emerge from the above analysis. The first 
is that privatization, which is driven by economic and technological impera­
tives, is an eminently political process. It is political in a number of ways: it 
redistributes property rights and potential power; it is shaped by political ide­
ology and it is mediated by national political institutions, constitutions, party 
politics, interest group configurations and bureaucracies; it alters the institu­
tional framework and policy networks through which citizens articulate, me­
diate and promote individual and collective actions33.
The second general conclusion is that privatization has been dominated by 
state presence - before, during and after the process. This continuing presence 
of the state raises the complex question of the relationship between ownership, 
influence and control. Assertions about the lack of autonomy of public sector 
bosses may be true, and there is no doubt that many public sector bosses have 
favoured privatization as a means of escaping from politically imposed objec­
tives, of gaining easier access to the international capital markets, of facilitat­
ing alliances, mergers and acquisitions, of weakening the surveillance of Brus­
sels, and of removing barriers to changes in corporate culture (see for exam­
ple, the interview with the President of Elf-Aquitaine in Financial Times, 28 
January 1994). But lack of autonomy is not universally true. Indeed, there is 
evidence of the growing autonomy of public sector bosses throughout Western 
Europe. Francis Mer, chairman of Usinor-Sacilor, the state-owned French 
steel group, could claim that the privatization would have little impact on the 
management of the group: "we are run like a private-sector company. There is 
no interference from the state" (Financial Times, 28 October 1994). A similar 
claim was made by the Chairman of Repsol, the Spanish public sector oil 
group (Financial Times, 23 May 1991). It is worth noting that in France dur­
33 Ellen Pint, op. cit.; Harvey B. Feigenbaum and Jeffrey R. Henig, ‘The Political Under­
pinnings of Privatization’, World Politics, Vol. 46 (2), January 1994, pp. 185-208; Joel 




























































































ing the 1970s public banks enjoyed almost complete autonomy whilst several 
major private industrial enterprises were the object of constant state dirigisme. 
Indeed, it has been claimed that the enterprises nationalised by the Socialists in 
1981 enjoyed, after 1984, greater freedom from state control than they had 
under private ownership during the Giscard d’Estaing presidency-^.
France is not the only European country in which public enterprises have 
constituted ‘Etats dans l’Etat’, independent fiefs ruled by powerful barons who 
dictated their terms to their nominal political masters: ‘agency capture’ was a 
well known phenomenon under public ownership. However, as we noted 
above, new modes of regulation may, paradoxically, endow the state with bet­
ter instruments of influence over privatized industries than traditional minis­
terial control over nationalised industries. It would appear that the autonomy 
of a private or public manager may hinge less on ownership than on the nature 
of the political system, the national industrial culture, the prevailing political 
climate, the market position of the industry, its financial situation, its per­
ceived strategic value, its dependence of public procurement policy, and on the 
nature of the product. If the good produced is seen as a public good - and 
water, electricity, gas and telecommunications appear to be so - the industry 
will incur social welfare costs and remain in the political domain.
This leads to our third major conclusion: that privatization has triggered a 
debate about the limits of privatization. Constitutional courts and ordinary 
courts have been called upon to define the inalienable arena of public activity, 
and their responses have underlined the profound philosophical differences 
about the conception of the state across Western Europe. This, in turn, raises 
difficult questions of how to resolve the tensions which result from attempting 
to reconcile the demands of the international market place and deep-seated 
national prejudices about the proper role of the state35.
The fourth major conclusion relates to the increasing obfuscation which 
continues to characterise the relationships between the state and its major 
firms. Privatization was designed in some countries to clarify, simplify and
3/* Vincent Wright, ‘The Nationalization and Privatization of French Enterprises, 1981-1988’, 
Staatswissenschaften und S tacts praxis, No. 2, 1990, pp. 195-198.
35 On the general issue of public-private interaction see two excellent articles by Amaud 
Sales, ‘The Private, the Public and Civil Society: Social Realms and Power Structure’, In­
ternational Political Science Review, Vol. 12 (4), 1991, pp.295-312, and by Martin Rein, 
‘The Social Structure of Institutions: Neither Public nor Private’, in Sheila B. Kamerman 
and Alfred J. Kahn (eds.). Privatization and the Welfare State, Princeton, Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1989. There is a good discussion also in Peter Self, Government by the 




























































































stabilise those relationships. The fluid and sometimes unpredictable nature of 
developing regulation, together with two other indirect consequences - hy­
bridisation and the blurring of the public-private boundary - have aggravated 
this problem36. These twin phenomena have resulted from a series of complex 
operations: the internationalisation strategies of semi-privatized or wholly pri­
vatized firms, through acquisitions, mergers, share swapping, joint research 
and investment ventures - often with public companies; the penetration of sev­
eral privatized companies by state interests, state personnel and state potential 
vetos. Many major national private industrial groups are thus part interna­
tional and part public.
The final general conclusion is that privatization does not necessarily reduce 
complexity, acrimony, politicisation or uncertainty in the relations between 
states and their major enterprises. The British experience suggests that the 
problems of complexity, acrimony, politicisation and uncertainty will not dis­
appear with wholesale radical privatization. The new modes of regulation are 
fluid, political (often personalised), bargained and sometimes unpredictable - 
not unlike those which prevailed under nationalisation.
Political, state-dominated, obfuscated, complex and uncertain - these are 
amongst the major characteristics of the privatization programmes being car­
ried out in Western Europe. Given the ambitions invested in privatization this 
is indeed a highly paradoxical situation. Some of the paradoxes described may 
be transient - the result of partial privatization programmes which are destined 
to become complete - and some may be country specific. Thus, the continued 
state’s presence amongst the management of privatized companies is specific to 
France, whilst the concentration of industrial and financial power and the limi­
tation of competition as the result of privatization is a feature of Italian priva­
tization). Some paradoxes are also more apparent than real: thus, the hostility 
of the United Kingdom towards the European Union is directed to the political 
and social ambitions of Brussels and not towards it furthering of an open and 
integrated market in which privatization has its logic. Finally, some of the 
paradoxes may be explained by the policy features outlined in Part II of this 
article. Thus, policy linkage to internationalisation, liberalisation and deregu­
lation partly explains the hybridisation of privatized firms and the paradox of 
obfuscation. Policy perversion - unintended consequences - explains several
36 For a recent discussion on the public-private interpenetration see James A. Caporaso and 
David P. Levine, Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge, CUP, 1992; Jan-Erik Lane 
(ed.). State and Market: The Politics of the Public and the Private, Londen, Sage Publica­
tions, 1985; Jan Kooiman, Modem Governance: New Government-Society Interaction, 




























































































paradoxes, such as the purchase of privatized shares by foreign public enter­
prises, which undermines one of the declared intentions of privatization - the 
protection of national industry.
However, the above article also suggests that some of the more profound 
paradoxes are of a general and permanent nature and may be inherent in the 
privatization process itself. Privatization has been driven by several motives 
and shaped by multiple objectives: maximising revenues from sales whilst 
ensuring the political legitimacy of privatization by selling cheaply to a mass 
public; accepting the logic of European Union and international market pres­
sures whilst protecting national industry; wishing for a mass shareholding in 
the name of popular capitalism but ensuring greater managerial autonomy. 
The conflicting tensions are no less apparent in the new regulatory bodies 
which exist in Britain and which are destined to exist elsewhere as the liberali­
sation and privatization of sectors dominated by national monopolies proceeds. 
Like politicians with nationalised industries, regulators of privatized industries 
must attempt to reconcile the interests of the nation (protection against foreign 
predators), managers (stability and profits), shareholders (dividends), con­
sumers (quality and prices), workers (safety), citizens (pollution control, for 
example), and politicians. They must juggle with these conflicting interests 
while confronting the regulatory dilemma: gaining access to a regulated enter­
prise may require lightening the regulatory regime - which may lead to accu­
sations of collusion - whilst a tighter regulatory regime may gain the regulator 
greater public credibility but may block access to information - an essential 
ingredient of effective regulation. The paradoxes are, therefore, ultimately 
rooted in the inherent tensions between nation and market place, between pub­
lic and private, and between the conflicting demands of a pluralistic society. 
Privatization has many advantages but it is no policy panacea. Indeed, it sug­
gests that not only are yesterday’s problems today’s policies, but that today’s 
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